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Whilst in popular discourse the Arctic and Antarctic are often unrealistically cast as two sides 
of the same polar coin, elite discourse is similarly myopic. The latter rarely gets past the 
manifest historic differences in human residence, legal and governance arrangements in the 
two regions. We comfort ourselves that the perennial demands that something done better at 
one pole be picked up too in our arrangements at the other pole are naïve: that the differences 
between the places are substantive and compelling rather than merely contingent, and that 
accordingly the status quo in both regions (plus or minus a modicum of tinkering) will 
suffice. 
 I want to propose that there are in fact commonalities between the Arctic and the 
Antarctic, beyond the trite; that indeed these commonalities are at the heart of the challenges 
that our governance of both regions will face in the first half of the 21st Century – 
notwithstanding the differences that will inform quite how these challenges present, or may 
best be solved. 
 At the heart of the challenges, as I see them, is the question of international equity in 
relation to access to not only resources (that familiar concern) but standing in the creation of 
the global order in this century. The latter in particular, as we see everywhere, leads us down 
various paths marked “nationalism”, “national dignity”, etc, and segues into stances variously 
labeled as post-colonial, neo-colonial, racist, globalist, etc. 
 Cut away the gentrified rationales and it is possible to see the Arctic and the Antarctic 
as hitherto peripheral spaces that have been appropriated by “The  West” in the period since 
the end of the 19th Century. Formal territorial claims were asserted by adjacent powers – 
Western Europeans, North Americans and the emergent “white” states that were formerly 
their colonies. Russia is of course the exception – adjacent but only periodically and partially 
“Western”. In the Arctic, territorial claims were enabled by contiguity or proximity, longer 
historic association, and the (at least formal) incorporation of the actually resident native 
peoples of the Arctic into the modern state polities. In the Antarctic, a circumpolar ocean 
intervened, we got there late, and there were no indigenous peoples to divest. 
 Stand back and view this from the standpoint of different sorts of states (say, a range 
from Ethiopia to China) that were not involved in this – because they did not exist as 
Westphalian states, or they self-identified as peoples and political entities but were 
dispossessed by colonization, or they were so economically, technically or politically 
enfeebled at the critical moments that they were not in the game. Well, at least for the 
majority, this has now changed, for some to a very considerable degree. But they didn’t just 
miss the appropriation, they missed the elaboration of the very global order, with its attendant 
international political and legal rules and norms, that now dictates how these places are 
managed. And that management seems rarely, in their estimation, to benefit them. Perhaps 
only with the process that led to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention did most of the Global 
South first participate in any international process that might have a bearing on rights and 
duties in the polar regions. It is not clear yet whether this has materially improved their 
prospects in either polar region, but it may have. 
 The states that actually control the nature of activity (albeit not every particular 
activity) in both the Arctic and the Antarctic remain the states who assert an actual territorial 
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sovereignty and claim attendant coastal state rights (in the Arctic: Canada, 
Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and the US; in the Antarctic claims are of course 
disputed – as that word is ordinarily understood) or have standing in a de facto condominium 
(the Antarctic in particular). Notwithstanding the broader membership of the Antarctic 
condominium, the seven claimants (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway and the UK)  and two semi-claimants (Russia and the US) remain the most powerful 
shapers of the dispensation. 
 It seems rather unlikely that this state of affairs will continue to be acceptable – 
whatever one’s personal inclinations may be, and whatever futures one may prefer to see in 
the Arctic and Antarctic. The new global order that we already see emerging, will necessarily 
be one in which a broader range of states (at least) must be sanguine about the international 
arrangements in the Arctic and Antarctic (as elsewhere). Whilst hitherto nobody has been 
battering down the existing arrangements (yet), these seem increasingly isolated refuges of 
narrowly western interests. One must assume that change will be necessary, as real power 
moves in the international order, but so far there is not the slightest indication that our 
international governance arrangements in either the Arctic or Antarctic are evolving to 
address global equity issues, let alone the place of major emergent powers. 
 The risks inherent in this are obvious: firstly that one is at risk of strategic surprise; 
second that if one is  unrealistic strategically, one’s tactics in relation to particular issues (say, 
positions on resource access and extraction) are also problematical; third that until the overall 
framing of one’s stance is determined it never seems possible to argue for the bottom-line on 
things that must be delivered if one is to give up something else. 
 The challenge for the respective polar regimes is not necessarily to adopt common 
forms of response to the 21st Century realities of our world, but it is surely necessary for each 
to respond, and in so doing to recognize commonalities and the need to make the Arctic and 
Antarctic governance arrangements fit for purpose in the world as it now exists. 
